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 SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS AND VOTING POWER 
Evidence from Italian Listed Firms  








Abstract. This work provides an empirical investigation of shareholders’ agreements signed in Italy 
over the last decade. The focus is on the impact of agreements on the voting power (Shapley value) 
of participants. The evidence shows that agreements produce a remarkable reshuffling of voting 
power. Two views are confronted. First: agreements allow the largest shareholder to increase his 
power beyond his own voting rights, exploiting a leverage effect. Second: agreements are a way to 
share control among a coalition of large shareholders, thus limiting the ability of the first one to 
extract private benefits of control. The leverage effect seems to prevail at lower levels of ownership 
concentration, while the shared control view works better at higher levels of ownership 
concentration. Supermajority rules – a tool to reach a more balanced distribution of power – are 
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  The literature on corporate governance has recently begun to analyze the strategic 
interaction among multiple large shareholders
1. This approach goes beyond the more traditional 
“large shareholder” framework, where the ownership structure is made up of one dominant owner 
and many small dispersed investors
2. It gives a deeper understanding of the ways in which agency 
issues – due to the separation between ownership and control – are tackled in corporations with a 
significant level of ownership concentration.  
  This work contributes to this literature by providing an empirical analysis of shareholders’ 
agreements: these are contracts through which some large shareholders bind themselves (for a pre-
specified period) to coordinate their voting behaviour in the general shareholders’ meeting. In Italy 
– the country analyzed here – agreements have become widely used in recent years. They have a 
quite significant presence also in other European countries and in the US.
3   
Do agreements worsen or improve corporate governance? Two views are confronted. Under 
the first one (labelled “leverage” here), agreements are seen as a device to deviate from the one-
share-one-vote principle: the idea is that an agreement enables the dominant shareholder to increase 
his power beyond that implied by his own voting rights, thus making it easier the extraction of 
private benefits of control. Following this approach, agreements play the same role as pyramids and 
dual-class shares. Under the second view (labelled “shared control” here), agreements are a way to 
form a coalition of large shareholders, sharing control over firm’s assets: by reaching a more 
balanced distribution of power among participants, the first owner limits his ability to take decisions 
in his own exclusive interest (this effect is even stronger when supermajority rules are applied).  
Following this approach, agreements are a way to commit to a lower extraction of private benefits 
of control, playing a role similar to other corporate governance institutions – like independent 
directors and audit committees
4. 
     In order to verify which of these two views is more empirically grounded, I analyze a 
sample of agreements signed by shareholders of Italian listed companies over the last decade. They 
include a binding provision to coordinate participants’ votes in the shareholders’ meeting and/or to 
achieve a specific composition of the Board of Directors. The analysis is focussed on the impact of 
                                                 
1 The empirical relevance of companies with multiple large shareholders is documented (among others) by Laeven – 
Levine (2008) and Faccio – Lang (2002). Further references to the theoretical and empirical literature are given below 
(Section 3). 
2 See for example: Shleifer – Vishny (1986) and Burkart – Gromb – Panunzi (1997).   
3 EU (2007) provides data for the European countries (summarized in Section 3 below). Gomes – Novaes (2005) report 
some information for the US: in a random sample of 115 public firms announcing privately negotiated block 
transactions, they find the presence of agreements in 46% of them.    
4 The literature on board structure stresses the role of such institutions in limiting the agency costs due to the separation 
between ownership and control. Some references are provided in Baglioni (2008).     
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agreements on the voting power of participants, measured by their Shapley value: such impact 
crucially depends on the equity holdings of participants and of all the other shareholders, together 
with any supermajority rule governing the decision process taking place among participants. As far 
as I know, this is the first study taking this approach in analysing shareholders’ agreements – and 
more broadly the strategic interaction among large shareholders.  
    The evidence shows that agreements produce a remarkable reshuffling of voting power, 
weakening the link between voting rights and voting power. The leverage hypothesis works better 
for lower levels of ownership concentration, while the shared control view is more supported when 
ownership concentration is higher. The rationale behind this result is quite intuitive: a first owner 
with a small equity stake may want to exploit the leverage effect to strengthen his power; to the 
contrary, a first owner with a large equity stake may have the opposite need, namely to limit his 
own power in order to commit to a lower extraction of private benefits. The likelihood that a 
supermajority rule is included in an agreement contract is increasing in the first owner’s share of 
equity: thus the shared control hypothesis is confirmed to be more realistic for higher levels of 
ownership concentration.             
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some institutional information. 
Section 3 discusses the two hypotheses to be tested: leverage versus shared control. Section 4 
provides the empirical evidence and Section 5 summarizes the main results. The Appendix presents 
some robustness checks and a list of the agreements included in the sample.  
2. Institutional background 
  Shareholders’ agreements have become increasingly popular in Italy. Between 1990 and 
2006, the share of companies controlled through agreements over total listed companies has 
increased from 18% to 22% in value – and from 5% to 11% in number (see Bank of Italy, 2007).  
Agreements are regulated by the Italian “Consolidated Law on Finance”.
5 This imposes a disclosure 
requirement on shareholders of listed companies: agreements must be notified to Consob and 
published in abridged form in the daily press
6. It also sets a limit – three years –  to the duration of 
fixed-term agreements, which are renewable; most contracts do fix a three-year term
7.  
  The most relevant clauses frequently included in agreements are the following. 
Voting. Participants are committed to meet before any shareholders’ meeting and to reach a binding 
decision about the way of exercising their voting rights. This coordination usually takes place in a 
                                                 
5 Legislative Decree no.58 of 24 February 1998, articles 122-123. 
6 Consob is the Italian Authority on Financial Markets. The disclosure requirement has been detailed by Consob in its 
Regulation no.11971 of  14 May 1999 (articles 127-131). Extracts of the agreements are publicly available at Consob 
web-site (http://www.consob.it/). 
7 Contracts may also be concluded for an indeterminate period; in this case a party may withdraw by giving a six month 
notice.     
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body called “General Meeting/Managing Committee” (hereafter “Committee”) of the agreement, 
where a decision is passed if it is supported by those participants owing – at least – the simple 
majority of voting shares involved in the agreement. Sometimes a supermajority – even unanimity – 
is required.  
Consulting. Participants are committed to consult among themselves, in order to possibly reach a 
common way of voting in shareholders’ meetings, but they are not committed to reach a binding 
decision. 
Board composition. The composition of the Board of Directors is agreed upon. More specifically, 
each participant is given the right to indicate a number of Directors. Sometimes some voting rules 
are also agreed upon, requiring that all relevant decisions of the Board be taken by a supermajority. 
Transfer restriction. Trades on shares involved in the agreement are restricted. Very often pre-
emption rights are given to participants.  
3. Why do shareholders sign agreements? Two competing hypotheses 
In this work I try to identify how the allocation of voting power among shareholders is 
reshaped through agreements. To this aim, the “voting power change”  (VPC) for each participant 
in an agreement is defined in the following way. First, his “voting power outside agreement” is the 
probability of being pivotal in the general shareholders’ meeting, absent any agreement: the 
indicator used here is the Shapley-Shubik power index for “oceanic” games, which allows for the 
presence of an “ocean” of small shareholders. Second, the “voting power inside agreement” is the 
probability of being pivotal in the decision making process taking place within the agreement: the 
indicator used here is the Shapley-Shubik power index for finite-person voting games applied to the 
relevant governing body of the agreement. Third, the VPC of each participant is defined to be the 
difference between his voting power inside agreement and his voting power outside agreement 
(some examples are provided below)
 8.  
The empirical analysis of this work is focussed on agreements such that the voting rights of 
their participants sum up to the absolute majority of total voting shares. Consequently all relevant 
corporate decisions – that should be taken by the general shareholders’ meeting – are de facto taken 
within the agreement, with the shareholders’ meeting playing only a formal ratifying role. Then, in 
general, the redistribution of power among the participants to an agreement is not a zero-sum game: 
their VPCs sum up to a positive number equal to the overall voting power outside agreement of the 
non-participating shareholders, who loose their power due to the agreement. 
                                                 
8 The Shapley-Shubik power index was introduced by Shapley – Shubik (1954). It was extended to "oceanic" voting 
games by Milnor – Shapley (1978), considering a finite number of players endowed with finite voting weights and a 
continuous infinity of players (the "ocean") each with infinitesimal weight. See Leech (2001) for a discussion of 
different voting power indexes and for an application to corporate governance. I will be more specific about the nature 
of the relevant governing body in the next section, describing the data set.     
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The purpose of the analysis is to discriminate between two alternative hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: leverage. The agreement enables the first shareholder (the one owing the 
largest equity share) to increase his own voting power beyond the level implied by his voting rights. 
Consider Example 1. A firm has three large shareholders: A, B, and C, whose (voting) equity shares 
are shown in the second column; the remaining equity (45%) is hold by dispersed small investors 
(the “ocean”). Absent any agreement, the voting powers are those shown in the third column (with 
the ocean retaining 0.38 as a whole). By signing an agreement including a Voting clause
9, the three 
large shareholders are able to dominate the shareholders’ meeting: the agreement can rely on 55% 
of the voting rights. So shareholders’ decisions are taken within the agreement, where A retains the 
absolute majority of voting rights. This is an extreme example of the “leverage effect”: thanks to the 
agreement, the largest shareholder is able to reach a complete control of the firm, while retaining 
30% of the voting rights. Other cases may be seen where the leverage effect is at work, although not 
so strongly. The VPC variable is able to capture the leverage effect, as it is apparent in the last 
column.   












A 30%  0.39  1  0.61 
B 15%  0.13  0  -0.13 
C 10%  0.10  0  -0.10 
  Agreements are one among several ways available to obtain a leverage effect. The recent 
Report commissioned by the European Commission includes agreements among the Control 
Enhancing Mechanisms (CEMs) employed by European companies to deviate from the 
“proportionality” (or “one-share-one-vote”) principle, summarized as follows: “…share capital 
should normally carry control rights, in proportion to the risk carried” (EU 2007, page 7). In the 
sample of 464 companies analyzed in the Report, 44% have one or more CEMs, the most common 
of which are pyramid structures (27% of occurrences of CEMs), followed by multiple voting rights 
shares (21%) and by shareholders’ agreements (14%). The latter have a quite significant presence in 
Italy and Belgium, followed by France and Spain.
10 In particular, their relevance has been rapidly 
growing in the governance of Italian listed companies: Bianchi – Bianco (2007) show that over the 
last 15 years pyramids have been increasingly substituted by agreements – and by other types of 
“coalitions” among shareholders – as a way to implement the leverage of control (at the same time, 
non-voting shares have almost disappeared). Gianfrate (2007) analyzes a sample of Italian listed 
                                                 
9 The following three examples rely on this clause. It is easy to make similar examples relying on the Board 
composition clause. For instance, the same leverage effect shown in Example 1 is obtained if shareholder A is entitled 
to appoint 3 Directors, while B and C gets 1 Director each. 
10 23% of the Italian companies included in the sample have shareholders’ agreements; the percentage is 31% for 
Belgium, 18% for France and 13% for Spain.      
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companies, finding that agreements are typically used to get a leverage effect (measured as the ratio 
between board rights and voting rights), enjoyed mostly by the first shareholder; he also finds that 
the announcement of a new agreement is a “bad news” for the stock market.  
Following this approach, agreements may be seen as a way through which a dominant 
shareholder increases his ability to extract private benefits of control – or equivalently he reduces 
the cost of achieving the control of the firm
11.               
   Hypothesis 2: shared control. The agreement allows the first shareholder to limit his own 
voting power to the advantage of other large shareholders, achieving a more balanced distribution 
of power; since the agreement increases his need to find support by some other shareholders in the 
decision making process, the first shareholder commits to share control with them. Consider 
Example 2: those who gain from the agreement are the second and third large shareholders, while 
the first one looses some voting power; as a result, the voting power is evenly allocated under the 
agreement. Example 3 provides a case where the redistribution of power is even stronger, assuming 
that the agreement contract includes a unanimity clause: a decision is passed only if all of the three 
participants agree. The outcome is that the first shareholder gives up his full power and accepts an 
evenly distributed power. This is an extreme example: other supermajority rules – milder than 
unanimity – lead to similar though weaker redistributions of power. The last column shows how 













A 30%  0.37  0.33  -0.04 
B 20%  0.20  0.33 0.13 
C 15%  0.18  0.33 0.15 
 













A 55%  1  0.33 -0.67 
B 10%  0  0.33 0.33 
C 5%  0  0.33  0.33 
  The rationale behind this hypothesis may be found in the contributions to the theory of 
corporate ownership structure, stressing the role of multiple large shareholders in reducing the 
                                                 
11 The value of voting rights increases by deviating from the one-share-one-vote rule: this is a well documented 
phenomenon, and it is particularly relevant in Italy. Zingales (1994) shows that the value of control is extremely high in 
Italian listed companies: voting shares trade at an 82% premium over non-voting shares. Nicodano (1998) provides an 
explanation for this high premium, pointing to the combined leverage effects of pyramids and non-voting stock.   
Nenova (2003) shows how the value of control – measured by the price difference between multiple- and limited- 
voting shares – varies considerably across countries.           
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agency costs due to the ability of the dominant shareholder to extract private benefits of control – 
the assumption underlying this approach is that such costs are paid by the dominant shareholder 
himself through a higher cost of raising external equity. Following the seminal work of Jensen – 
Meckling (1976), Pagano – Roell (1998) analyze the choice of an entrepreneur, who has to decide 
how to allocate equity stakes to external investors: in their model, “the ownership structure acts as a 
pre-commitment device to limit agency costs”; in particular, the entrepreneur allocates shares to 
large minority shareholders, in such a way that they have the right incentive to monitor himself. 
Gomes – Novaes (2005) highlight the potentially positive role of bargaining between large 
shareholders sharing control over firms’ assets: this may prevent decisions that benefit only the 
controlling group and harm minority shareholders (although bargaining problems might result in 
corporate paralysis as well). Bennedsen – Wolfenzon (2000) stress that a controlling coalition of 
shareholders may have a larger cash flow stake than an individual owner, inducing it to internalize 
the consequences of its actions; the same incentive alignment argument points to a positive role for 
shareholders’ agreements.
12 
  On empirical grounds, Volpin (2002) finds that shareholders’ agreements in Italian listed 
companies lead to a better governance (measured by the sensitivity of managerial turnover to firm 
performance) and to a higher Q ratio. A more even distribution of equity stakes among several large 
shareholders exerts a positive effect on firm value: this is shown by Laeven – Levine (2008) using a 
large sample of companies listed in 13 European countries, and by Maury – Pajuste (2005) for 
Finnish listed firms (the latter find a negative relation between the Shapley value of the largest 
shareholder and firm value). The positive role played by multiple large shareholders is also shown 
by Faccio – Lang – Young (2001) for a large sample of European companies, finding that their 
presence increases dividend rates: this is taken as evidence of lower expropriation of small 
shareholders.    
Summing up, by following the shared control approach agreements may be seen as a device 
to commit to a lower extraction of private benefits of control, thus enhancing firm value.  
4. Empirical evidence 
4.1 Data and methodology 
The data set was built up by making use of agreements signed by shareholders of Italian listed 
companies in the last decade. The information (extracts available at the Consob web-site) is updated 
as of July 2007.  Only those agreements where at least one of the following two clauses is present 
                                                 
12 The role of multiple large shareholders is also analyzed by Bloch – Hege (2003). In their model two block-holders 
compete for control, by committing to a maximal amount of private benefits. A more even distribution of equity stakes 
between them leads to a lower extraction of private benefits by the controlling party.      
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have been selected: Voting and Board composition. All the agreements included in the sample are 
such that the voting rights of their participants sum up to the absolute majority (more than 50%) of 
total voting shares – with a few exceptions where participants altogether hold a strong relative 
majority. Therefore when the Voting clause is present, the agreement is supposed to be able to have 
his decisions passed in the general shareholders’ meeting. When the Board composition clause is 
present, the list of Directors presented by the agreement is supposed to be approved in the 
shareholders’ meeting.  
The information used for computing the voting power outside agreement is the share of 
voting equity owned by each participant as well as by all other relevant shareholders (namely those 
with an equity stake of at least 2%). When the Voting clause is present, the voting power inside 
agreement is the voting power index of each participant in the Committee of the agreement: the 
information used here is the equity shares owned by all participants together with any supermajority 
rule (if present). When the Voting clause is not present but the Board composition clause is present, 
the voting power inside agreement is the voting power index of each participant in the Board of 
Directors: here the relevant information is the number of Directors a participant is entitled to 
appoint, together with any supermajority rule (if present)
 13.  
It is important to note that the participants’ voting powers in the Committee and in the Board 
of Directors show a strong linear relationship: a correlation coefficient equal to 0.88.
14 This allows 
to say that the VPC variable is built up in a consistent way across the whole sample. Indeed, when 
both clauses – Voting and Board composition – are present, they are typically used in a very 
consistent way, pointing to the same direction in the redistribution of power among shareholders. 
Fig.A-1 (see the Appendix) provides further support to this statement: the VPCs computed by using 
the voting powers in the Committee and in the Board are plotted against each other, showing a 
strong linear relationship.   
The number of agreements initially considered was 102. However, for some of them (28) the 
VPC turns out to be zero for all the parties involved; most often, in such cases there is a dominant 
shareholder owing the absolute majority of equity, so that his voting power is 1 (with all the other 
parties having zero power) both outside and inside the agreement. These cases have been discarded, 
since they bear no interest for the issue at hand: of course, these agreements have been signed for 
other purposes (e.g. restricting ownership transfers) rather than for altering the voting power of 
                                                 
13 The information on relevant shareholders is available at Consob web-site. The Shapley-Shubik power indexes for 
oceanic and finite-person games have been computed by using the algorithms (ssocean and ssdirect respectively) 
available at Leech’s web-page: http://www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae/. See Leech (2002) for computation methods of 
voting power indexes. 
14 This value has been computed for those agreements – involving 132 participants altogether – for which it is possible 
to compute the VPC in both ways: by applying the Shapley-Shubik index to the Committee and to the Board as 
indicator of the voting power inside agreement.    
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participants. In addition, 3 agreements involve only local authorities as owners of public utilities: 
these have been discarded too, since our interest is on the interaction among private shareholders.  
As a result, the following analysis is carried out on a sample of 71 agreements
15, for a total of 381 
participants: the latter is the number of observations available for the econometric analysis.     
4.2 The impact of agreements: reshuffling shareholders’ voting power 
A look at the data is quite suggestive, pointing to a remarkable impact of the agreements on 
the distribution of voting power among shareholders. In Fig.1 the voting power outside agreement 
is plotted against the share of equity held by each participant in an agreement of the sample. It is 
easy to see that the voting power in the general meeting of a corporation increases rapidly and quite 
regularly as the equity stake of a shareholder grows; of course, any shareholder holding more than 
50% of equity has a voting power equal to 1.  
More interestingly Fig.2 shows that the picture becomes quite different when looking at the 
voting power inside agreement: the reshuffling of power is remarkable, as it is apparent by 
comparing the two figures. Fig.2 also highlights that the agreements make the link between voting 
power and ownership share become weaker; notice for example that a relevant number of 
participants with an equity stake lower than 50% get a voting power of 1, while someone else owing 
the absolute majority of equity gets a power lower than 1. A crude way of measuring this 
weakening of the relationship between power and ownership is by computing the correlation 
coefficient between the two variables: this turns out to be 0.88 for the voting power outside 
agreement and 0.68 for the voting power inside agreement.  
Finally, in Fig.3 the VPC is plotted against share ownership: for each participant, the VPC is 
just the vertical difference between his triangle in Fig.2 and his square in Fig.1. As it is apparent, no 
simple relationship emerges between VPC and ownership share.  
                                                 
15 43 of them have the Voting clause (of which 22 having the Board composition clause as well), and 28 have the Board 
composition clause only. A list of these agreements is provided in the Appendix.        
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4.3  Regression analysis 
Despite the complexity of the relationship between VPC and ownership share, it is possible 
to test which of the two hypotheses discussed in Section 3 is supported by the data collected in this 
work. This will be done by focussing on the VPC of the first shareholder versus the VPCs of all the 
other participants in an agreement. This analysis should enable us to say whether the reshuffling of 
voting power implemented through the agreements favours the first shareholder (leverage) or the 
other participants (shared control).  
The following equation (Model 1) has been estimated: 
            ε β β β + ⋅ + + + = S D D S c VPC 1 1 3 2 1                                                   (1) 
where VPC  is the voting power change of each participant in an agreement, S is his (percentage) 
share of equity,  1 D  is a dummy variable taking value 1 when a participant is the first shareholder in 
the firm where an agreement has been signed and zero otherwise.  
Table 1 – VPC and equity share:  
first shareholder vs. others (Model 1) 
OLS regression results 
Coefficient Estimated  Value 
(robust std.err.)* 
p-Value 
c  1.75 
(0.75) 
0.02 
1 β   0.67 
(0.15) 
0.00 
2 β   32.55 
(4.49) 
0.00 
3 β   -1.60 
(0.20) 
0.00 
    Dependent variable: VPC(%).  N.Obs.: 381. 
2 R : 0.23.   
* Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity: 
1 HC  are 
shown in the table; 
2 HC  and 
3 HC  are only slightly different 
(see MacKinnon – White 1985). The same holds for 
standard errors adjusted for clustering, where each 
agreement is a cluster (see Rogers 1993 and Williams 2000). 
  
The results shown in Table 1 are quite suggestive. All coefficients are highly significant and 
provide the following information. The first shareholder enjoys a large VPC for low levels of 
ownership (the intercept for his estimated regression line is 1.75+32.55=34.3), but his gain gets 
lower as his ownership stake increases (the slope of his line is 0.67-1.60=-0.93, implying that a 1% 
increase in ownership share leads to an almost 1% reduction of VPC). The opposite holds for all the 
other participants: their VPC is quite small for low levels of  ownership (intercept=1.75) and it 
increases as they retain more equity (slope=0.67). These patterns of the VPC are clearly illustrated 
by the fitted values plotted in Figure 4.
16 
                                                 
16 These results are robust to other specifications of the model. The Appendix provides two alternatives, where families 
and banks are given explicit consideration: neither of them leads to different conclusions from those presented here.      
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A simulation of Model 1 may help interpreting the regression results. Table 2 focuses on 
some interesting examples, where VPCs are computed by using the estimated parameters shown in 
Table 1. The first column shows a typical case of low ownership concentration (by Italian 
standards), with the first owner holding a 10% equity stake and any other participant holding (at 
most) a 5% stake: the VPCs are such that the former is able to further increase his own voting 
power relative to other shareholders; in this case the leverage effect is at work. The last column 
shows the opposite case, namely a representative firm with a high level of ownership concentration, 
say two large shareholders with 40% and 20% stakes respectively: it is apparent that the former 
looses some voting power in favour of the latter, leading to a more balanced distribution of power; 
this case supports the shared control hypothesis. The two intermediate columns refer to the median 
and mean ownership stakes held by the first and second shareholders of the firms included in the 
sample
17. 
The message given by the above results is quite clear. For low levels of ownership 
concentration, the reshuffling of voting power due to an agreement favours the first shareholder: 
this evidence points to the leverage effect. The opposite happens for high levels of ownership 
concentration, where the other shareholders benefit from the redistribution of power: here the 
shared control hypothesis receives an empirical support. 
                                                 
17 The equity stakes of the two largest participants in the agreements included in the sample are positively related to 
each other (their correlation coefficient is 0.39): thus the reasoning in the text  – where both the first participant and (at 
least) another one are supposed to hold either a low or a high share of equity – is correct. Moreover, most agreements 
involve only a small number of participants (73% of the agreements in the sample involve up to 5 shareholders, as it is 
apparent from Figure A-2 in the Appendix), where the second large shareholder plays quite a relevant role: on one hand 
he is in the best position to share control with the first owner, on the other hand he has much to loose from the leverage 
effect. This justifies the focus on the second shareholder in the simulation (in addition to the first one, of course).             
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First shareholder  10  25  26  10.1 30  6.4  40  -2.9 
Other  participants  5  5.1  11 9.1  14 11.1 20 15.1 
(1) Ownership shares are the median for the first shareholders (first row) and second shareholders 
(second row) participating in the agreements included in the sample.   
(2) Ownership shares are the mean for the first shareholders (first row) and second shareholders 
(second row) participating in the agreements included in the sample. 
 
  One may wonder which of the two situations is prevalent in the sample. The answer is that 
both have a significant presence and none of them prevails. As Table 2 shows, at their median level 
of ownership the first two shareholders receive roughly the same VPC (around 9-10%), so that 
neither leverage nor shared control is prevalent. The cumulated frequency reported in the Appendix 
(see Figure A-3, whole sample) shows that, on one side, roughly 40% of the agreements included in 
the sample have a first shareholder with a stake lower than 20%: in this region the leverage effect 
prevails, with the first shareholder receiving the largest gain of voting power. On the other side, 
almost 40% of first shareholders in the sample have equity stakes larger than 30%: here the shared 
control effect becomes prevalent, with the first shareholder receiving a very small or even negative 
VPC.     
  
4.4  Supermajority rules 
As discussed in Section 3, a way to achieve a more balanced distribution of power among large 
shareholders is to include a supermajority rule in the agreement contract. Intuitively a supermajority 
rule limits the power of the first shareholder, since he has to find support by some other participants 
in the agreement (all of them in case of a unanimity clause) to be able to have his decisions passed. 
We saw in Example 3 a case where a unanimity clause produces a remarkable reduction of voting 
power of the first shareholder, in favour of the other two participants. Even milder supermajority 
rules have the effect of limiting the power of the first shareholder. Example 4 shows a case where 
the agreement contract is supposed to include a supermajority rule such that a decision is passed in 
the Committee only if it is supported by at least 2/3 of the participants’ voting rights (37% of 
equity): the effect of the supermajority rule is that the first shareholder’s voting power inside the 
agreement is limited to 0.67 instead of 1, which would obtain with a simple majority (28% of 
equity).  
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Since supermajority rules are used to achieve a more balanced distribution of power among 
the large shareholders participating in agreements, the inclusion of such kind of rules in an 
agreement contract may be taken as evidence that the first shareholder is willing to share control 
with some other relevant owners. Then it is interesting to verify whether a higher level of ownership 
concentration increases the likelihood that a supermajority rule is included in an agreement 
contract: if this is the case, the above finding that the shared control hypothesis performs better at 
higher level of ownership concentration receives further support. We get a preliminary positive 
answer by looking at the cumulated frequency of the first shareholders’ holdings (see Figure A-3 in 
the Appendix): the comparison between the whole sample and the sub-sample, including only the 
agreements with supermajority rules, definitely points to a higher ownership concentration in the 
sub-sample. 
A rigorous analysis of the link between ownership concentration and supermajority rules is 
provided by the following probit model (Model 2) and linear probability model (Model 3), which 
have been estimated over the sample of 71 agreements selected in this work: 
) 1 ( ) 1 1 ( 1S c G S SM P β + = =                                                          (2) 
1 ) 1 1 ( 1S c S SM P β + = =                                                          (3) 
where:  1 = SM  when an agreement includes a supermajority rule and zero otherwise,  1 S  is the 
(percentage) share of equity held by the first shareholder participating in each agreement,  ) (⋅ G  is 










                                                 
18 An alternative specification has been estimated, where the independent variable is the sum of the equity shares held 
by the two largest shareholders. The regression results are quite similar to those shown in Table 3: the only difference is 
that the change in probability of supermajority, due to a unit increase of ownership share held by the two largest 
shareholders together, is 0.55% (instead of 0.65%).       
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Table 3 – Supermajority and ownership concentration 
Regression results 




p-Value Estimated  Value 
(robust std.err.)* 
p-Value 





1 β   0.0170 
(0.0084) 




dP  at S1=30.3**  0.0065 
(0.0032) 
0.043  
Observed P = 0.394 
Fitted P (at S1=30.3) = 0.391 
Dependent variable: SM. N.Obs.: 71. *Standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity:
1 HC  are shown in the table, 
2 HC  and 
3 HC  are only slightly 
different. **30.3 is the average value of S1.  
  
The regression results shown in Table 3 confirm the existence of a positive and statistically 
significant link between the two variables: a one percentage point increase in the ownership share of 
the largest shareholder leads to a 0.65% increase of the probability that a supermajority rule is 
included in an agreement contract.
19 This outcome is quite robust and it is supported by both the 
linear and the probit models: not only they provide the same estimate of the change in probability 
due to an increase in ownership share, but also the probit model points to a linear relationship 
between the two variables – as it is apparent from Figure A-4. The goodness-of-fit, measured by the 
observed and fitted probabilities, is very satisfactory.   
The estimated coefficients imply that in a firm with low ownership concentration, say a 10% 
first shareholder’s equity stake, the probability of a supermajority rule being included in the 
agreement is 26%; this probability is remarkably larger (46%) in firms with high ownership 
concentration (40% first owner’s share of equity), and it doubles (52%) when the first owner holds 
a 50% equity stake.     
        Summing up, we may say that a higher ownership concentration leads to a larger 
probability that an agreement contract includes a supermajority rule, which is used to limit the 
voting power of the first shareholder in favour of the other participants. This result confirms that the 
shared control hypothesis receives more empirical support when the ownership concentration is 
higher.  
                                                 
19 As it is well known, the estimated coefficients of the probit model cannot be directly given a probability 
interpretation (contrary to the linear model); so the estimated change in probability due to a unit increase of S1 (at the 
average value of S1) has been reported in Table 3.      
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5. Concluding remarks 
  The link between voting rights and voting power (Shapley value) is severely affected by 
shareholders’ agreements, which produce a redistribution of voting power among participants. The 
empirical analysis presented in this work delivers a clear result: for low levels of ownership 
concentration, the reshuffling of voting power favours the first shareholder, while for high levels of 
ownership concentration it favours the other relevant owners. This outcome is interpreted as 
follows. When the first shareholder retains a relatively small equity stake (say 10%), he may want 
to exploit an agreement with other shareholders to strengthen his decision power: in this case the 
“leverage effect” is the motivation behind the agreement. To the contrary when the first owner has a 
large stake (say 40%), his position is so strong that he may want to send a signal that he is ready to 
limit his own ability to extract private benefits of control, in order to reduce agency costs: so he 
gives up some decision  power by  sharing control with other participants in an agreement.  
  This result, obtained by analysing the voting power change of participants in agreements, is 
confirmed by the analysis of supermajority rules: these are employed to limit the power of the first 
owner, since a decision is passed only if it is supported by several participants in the agreement (all 
of them when unanimity is required). The empirical evidence shows that the larger the equity stake 
of the first owner, the higher the probability that a supermajority rule is included in an agreement 
contract: again, the “shared control” hypothesis works better for high levels of ownership 
concentration.     
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*A similar picture obtains by considering the ownership share held by the two 
largest shareholders together: the cumulated frequency for the sub-sample lies 
below that for the whole sample. 
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Robustness checks: families and banks 
In order to test whether Model 1 is robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables, let 
us first consider agreements among family members who are large shareholders of the same 
company: these will be labelled “family agreements”. One might suspect that in this kind of 
agreements the interaction among participants is somehow different from other agreements. 
Therefore Model 1 has been modified by distinguishing among four groups of shareholders: a base 
group including those who are not first shareholders and participate in “not family agreements”, a 
second group including those who are first shareholders and participate in “not family agreements”, 
a third group including those who are not first shareholders and participate in “family agreements”, 
and finally a fourth group including those who are first shareholders and participate in “family 
agreements”. Then we have to include three dummy variables into the following equation:  
ε β β β β β β β + ⋅ + + ⋅ + + ⋅ + + + = S F D F D S F D F D S NF D NF D S c VPC 1 1 1 N 1 N 1 1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1          (A1) 
where VPC  is the voting power change of each participant in an agreement, S is his (percentage) 
share of equity,  NF D1  is a dummy variable taking value 1 when a participant  is the first 
shareholder in the firm where a “not family agreement” has been signed and zero otherwise,  F D 1 N 
is a dummy variable taking value 1 when a participant is not the first shareholder in the firm where 
a “family agreement” has been signed and zero otherwise,  F D1  is a dummy variable taking value 1 
when a participant is the first shareholder in the firm where a “family agreement” has been signed 
and zero otherwise.  
The estimated coefficients shown in the upper four rows of Table A.1 have the same sign 
and similar magnitude compared to those shown in Table 1: the patterns of the first and other 
shareholders’ VPCs – as function of their ownership shares – are fully confirmed for “not family 
agreements”. Thus the analysis presented in Section 4 is robust to the separate consideration of 
agreements among family members. None of the coefficients in the lower four rows of Table A.1 is 
significantly different from zero: this means that it is not possible to detect any specific pattern of 
the VPC for “family agreements” – neither for the first shareholder nor for the other participants. 
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Table A.1 – Family vs. not-family agreements (Model A1) 
OLS regression results 
Coefficient Estimated  Value 
(robust std.err.)* 
p-Value 
c  1.66 
(0.68) 
0.02 
1 β   0.70 
(0.17) 
0.00 
2 β   36.58 
(5.88) 
0.00 
3 β   -1.70 
(0.22) 
0.00 
4 β   0.93 
(6.60) 
0.89 
5 β   -0.20 
(0.50) 
0.69 
6 β   18.55 
(15.17) 
0.22 
7 β   -1.21 
(0.76) 
0.11 
    Dependent variable: VPC(%).  N.Obs.: 381. 
2 R : 0.24. 
    *  Standard  errors  robust  to  heteroskedasticity: 
1 HC  are 
shown in the table; 
2 HC  and 
3 HC  are only slightly different. 
The same holds for standard errors adjusted for clustering, 
where each agreement is a cluster. 
 
  Another robustness check has been done by focussing on agreements where the controlled 
company is a bank (hereafter “bank agreements”). In Italy banks hold significant equity shares in 
other companies (both financial and not financial), often retaining control over them through 
coalitions with other relevant shareholders. Actually some large banks included in the sample (e.g. 
Mediobanca, Capitalia, Banca Intesa) are quite active in the network of cross-ownerships and cross-
directorships involving many important Italian firms.
20 Therefore the interaction among participants 
in an agreement controlling a bank might have specific features. To test whether this is the case, a 
model similar to (A1) has been estimated, where four groups of shareholders are distinguished: a 
base group including those who are not first shareholders and participate in “not bank agreements”, 
a second group including those who are first shareholders and participate in “not bank agreements”, 
a third group including those who are not first shareholders and participate in “bank agreements”, 
and finally a fourth group including those who are first shareholders and participate in “bank 
agreements”. The following equation includes three dummy variables:  
ε β β β β β β β + ⋅ + + ⋅ + + ⋅ + + + = S B D B D S B D B D S NB D NB D S c VPC 1 1 1 N 1 N 1 1 7 6 5 4 3 2 1           (A2) 
where the variable names have the same meaning as above, with “bank” replacing “family”. 
The estimated coefficients shown in the upper four rows of Table A.2 have the same sign 
and similar magnitude compared to those shown in Table 1: the VPC patterns (as function of 
ownership) are again fully confirmed, both for the first shareholder and for the other participants in 
“not bank agreements”. Therefore the analysis presented in Section 4 is robust when controlling for 
“bank agreements”. As for the other coefficients, those of the first shareholder participating in 
“bank agreements” ( 6 β  and  7 β ) are highly significant and point to a VPC pattern similar to that of 
the first shareholder participating in “not bank agreements” ( 2 β  and  3 β ) – although the intercept is 
remarkably larger. Finally,  4 β  and  5 β  are not significantly different from zero: apparently “bank 
                                                 
20 See the evidence provided by Santella – Drago – Paone (2006).      
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agreements” do not differ from others, as far as the VPC of participants other than first are 
concerned. 
Table A.2 – Bank vs. not-bank agreements (Model A2) 
OLS regression results 
Coefficient Estimated  Value 
(robust std.err.)* 
p-Value 
c  1.57 
(0.87) 
0.07 
1 β   0.68 
(0.15) 
0.00 
2 β   30.94 
(5.00) 
0.00 
3 β   -1.59 
(0.21) 
0.00 
4 β   1.23 
(1.37) 
0.37 
5 β   -0.12 
(0.37) 
0.75 
6 β   43.20 
(6.64) 
0.00 
7 β   -1.66 
(0.24) 
0.00 
    Dependent variable: VPC(%).  N.Obs.: 381. 
2 R : 0.24. 
    *  Standard  errors  robust  to  heteroskedasticity: 
1 HC  are 
shown in the table; 
2 HC  and 
3 HC  are only slightly different. 
The same holds for standard errors adjusted for clustering, 
where each agreement is a cluster.    
 
          
List of agreements 
A list of the agreements analyzed in this work follows. All of them refer to companies listed 
on the Milan Stock Exchange. The year when each agreement has been signed or renewed is also 
shown; the information on relevant shareholders (used to compute the voting power indexes) refer 
to the same year.  
 
A.S. ROMA (2007) 
AEROPORTO DI FIRENZE (2007) 
AIR DOLOMITI (2001) 
ALERION INDUSTRIES (2006) 
ARKIMEDICA (2007) 
AUTOSTRADE (2005) 
BANCA ANTONVENETA (2002) 
BANCA INTESA (2005) 
BANCA ITALEASE (2005) 
BENI STABILI (2007) 
BIESSE (2001) 




CASSA DI RISPARMIO DI FIRENZE (2006) 
CSP INTERNATIONAL (2007) 
DADA (2005) 
DATA SERVICE (2007) 
DATAMAT (2000) 













GRANDI NAVI VELOCI (2004) 





LA DORIA (2006) 
LA RINASCENTE (1997) 
LINIFICIO – CANAPIFICIO NAZIONALE (2006)    
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M&C MANAGEMENT E CAPITALI (2006) 














RENO DE MEDICI (2007) 
REPLY (2004) 
RETI BANCARIE (2004) 
RGI (2007) 
ROLO BANCA (2000) 
SAVINO DEL BENE (2003) 
SEAT – PAGINE GIALLE (2007) 
SIRTI (2007) 
SNIA (2002) 
TAMBURI INVESTMENTS PARTNERS (2005) 
TAS (2000) 
TELECOM ITALIA (2007) 
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